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381 00 Trento, Italy
May 28, 2008
￿I think it may be useful to clear up a few historical misconceptions. The word Macroeco-
nomics was coined, and ￿rst used, to the best of my knowledge, by Jan Tinbergen, in 1936
([63]). Tinbergen used it again, in the Preface to his famous League of Nations monograph, in
1939 ([64]. John Fleming in late 1938 and Erik Lindahl in 1939, were two of the other pioneers
in the coining of the word ([16], p.333 and [31], p.52). All three introduced the word with
a hyphen, as Macro-economics (Lindhal￿ s Preface was dated June and Tinbergen￿ s, January,
1939). It was, however, Lindahl who introduced it, contrasting the word, and the subject it
was to circumscribe, with micro-economics. Lindahl had coined the word several years before
the ￿nal publication of the English translation of his celebrated work in 1939. He had, previ-
ously and subsequently, debated with Bertil Ohlin on the desirability of the words macro- and
micro-economics as against Ohlin￿ s suggestion of partial- and total-economics, respectively
(cf. [32], p.243). Contrary to unscholarly remarks, even by a serious scholar like the late Leif
Johansen, in his ￿ Nobel Article￿on Frisch ([25], p.306 ), the word does not appear in Frisch￿ s
celebrated Cassel Festschrift article. All that Johansen had to do was to read Propagation
Problems and Impulse Problems in Dynamic Economics ￿without simply ￿ quoting￿it. Even
worse, in a recent textbook by two Danish authors, ([57], p.558-9), Introducing Advanced
Macroeconomics, Slutzky is, incredibly, asserted to be an ￿ Italian statistician￿and Wick-
sell￿ s ￿ rocking horse￿metaphor is given a wholly incorrect ￿rst reference and date. Frisch,
himself, gave an incorrect reference when he ￿rst referred to it in his Cassel Festschrift
paper. I make these points only because these careless mistakes are made by Norwegian and
Danish economists, who - more than anyone else - should be able to verify serious references in
the original languages without any di¢ culty. Just for completion, and to save future students
the toil I had to undergo to straighten simple facts, the ￿rst mention of the rocking horse
metaphor by Wicksell was in 1918, in a review article of a little known book by an even lesser
known economist by the name of Karl Petander ([69], p.71, footnote 1).
yI am deeply indebted to my friends and colleagues, Professors Gianni Pegoretti and Stefano
Zambelli for straightening and strengthening my scholarship on many issues dealt with in this
paper. Alas, no one but ￿ I mean, not even ￿ Professor Zambelli can be blamed for the
remaining infelicities in this paper.
1Abstract
Frank Ramsey￿ s classic framing of the dynamics of optimal savings, [51]
as one to be solved as a problem in the calculus of variations and Ragnar
Frisch￿ s imaginative invoking of a felicitous Wicksellian metaphor to provide
the impulse-propagation dichotomy, in a stochastic dynamic framework, for the
tackling the problem of business cycles[17], have come to be considered the
twin fountainheads of the mathematization of macroeconomics in its dynamic
modes ￿at least in one dominant tradition. The intertemporal optimization
framework of a rational agent, viewed as a signal processor, facing the impulses
that are propagated through the mechanisms of a real economy, provide the
underpinnings of the stochastic dynamic general equilibrium (SDGE) model
that has become the benchmark and frontier of current macroeconomics.
In this paper, on the 80th anniversary of Ramsey￿ s classic and the 75th
anniversary of Frisch￿ s Cassel Festschrift contribution, an attempt is made to
characterize the mathematization of macroeconomics in terms of the frontier
dominance of recursive methods. There are, of course, other - probably more
enlightened ￿ways to tell this fascinating story. However, although my preferred
method would have been to tell it as an evolutionary development, since I am
not sure that where we are represents progress, from where we were, say 60
years ago, I have chosen refuge in some Whig fantasies.
JEL Classi￿cation Codes: B16, B22, B23, C60.
Key Words: Macrodynamics, Mathematical Economics, Dynamic Economics,
Computational Economics.
21 Preamble
"....[A]s economic analysts we are directed by, if not prisoners of,
the mathematical tools we possess."
Thomas J. Sargent: Macroeconomic Therory (2nd Ed.), p. xix.
Macroeconomics, almost by de￿nition, is about the dynamics of aggregate
variables. The aggregates, in modern macroeconomics, are required to be un-
derpinned by microeconomic foundations; the dynamics, considered from an ab-
stract mathematical point of view, could be either deterministic or stochastic.
The frontiers of mathematical macroeconomics are dominated by the mathe-
matical methodology of recursive macroeconomics.
The quali￿cation ￿ recursive￿here has nothing to do with formal ￿ recursion
theory￿ . Instead, this is a reference to the mathematical formalizations of
the rational economic agent￿ s intertemporal optimization problems, in terms
of Markov Decision Processes (MDP), (Kalman) Filtering (KF) and Dynamic
Programming (DP) where a kind of ￿ recursion￿is invoked in the solution meth-
ods. The pioneers1 associated with the development of these three ￿ theoreti-
cal technologies￿ , the current modelling workhorses of mathematical macroeco-
nomics are, Abraham Wald, Rudolf Kalman and Richard Bellman, respectively.
The metaphor of the rational economic agent as a ￿ signal processor￿ , imple-
menting MDP, using the KF within the DP framework underpins the recursive
macroeconomic paradigm.
The Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium model (henceforth, SDGE),
although developed within the recursive macroeconomic paradigm, has come to
be acknowledged as the benchmark for all mainstream macroeconomic theo-
ries. Signi￿cantly, for a subject that, at its renascence at the hands of Wicksell,
Lindahl, Myrdal, Hayek and Keynes was intrinsically monetary in nature, the
SDGE model is devoid of monetary content. Therefore, in telling a story of
the mathematization of macroeconomics, I shall have to ignore all theoretical
technologies that were part of the development of monetary macrodynamics.
This will explain, although not excuse, two relative absences: the neglect of
any of the mathematical developments ￿ particularly (non-linear) dynamical
systems theory ￿associated with overlapping generations models (OLG)2; and,
even more unfortunately, all issues of combinatorial optimization3. But these
two mathematical technologies ￿nonlinear dynamics and combinatorial mathe-
1However, as in the case of many pioneers, the very act of de￿ning and delineating a subject
conceptually and technically leads to discoveries of prior giants on whose shoulders we may
be standing, without always realizing it explicitly. In this case, Richard Day pioneered the
recursive programming approach to modelling adaptively economizing agents in the face of
disequilibria in price and quantity variables many decades before the formal appearance of
recursive macroeconomics (cf., for example, [8]).
2Except in one simple instance, in section 4, where a stylised OLG model is used as a
￿ vehicle￿to suggest a particular recursive mode of learning a rational expectations equilibrium
(REE).
3Here, my main concern is the neglect of the innovative combinatorial ￿number theoretic ￿
mathematical lessons to be learned from the monetary model developed by Clower and Howitt
([6]).
3matics (whether in an optimization context or not) ￿are impossible to avoid in
any discipline in which the digital computer is ubiquitous.
And economic theory, at every level and at almost all frontiers - be it micro-
economics or macroeconomics, game theory or IO - is now almost irreversibly
dominated by digitally determined ￿i.e., based on the processing of economic
data via the digital computer ￿ computational, numerical4 and experimental
considerations. This means, willy-nilly, intrinsic nonlinear dynamical and com-
binatorial mathematics have to be considered, simply because the mathematics
of the computer invokes it. Curiously, though, none of the macroeconomic
frontier emphasis from any one of these three points of view - computational,
numerical or experimental - is underpinned by the natural algorithmic math-
ematics of either computability theory or constructive analysis5. In particular,
the much vaunted ￿eld of Computable General Equilibrium theory, with explicit
claims that it is based on constructive and computable foundations is neither the
one, nor the other6. The dominance of computational and numerical analysis,
powerfully underpinned by serious approximation theory ￿for example in the
de￿nition and derivation of a recursive competitive equilibrium, the norm of the
SDGE model ￿is devoid of formal algorithmic foundations. This curious case
of a Hamlet without the Prince can, in my opinion, only be explained by the
historical accident of economic theory having been formalized and mathema-
tized by classical real analysis; a typical example of ￿ lock-in￿and the pernicious
in￿ uences of the QWERTY principle.
The story of the mathematization of economic theory7 has been told by the
doyen of 20th century mathematical economics, Gerard Debreu, in a series of
exceptionally clear articles8, if also written with a particularly narrow vision
and understanding of the nature and scope of mathematics (cf., [10], [11], [12])
4By this I aim to refer to classical numerical analysis, which has only in recent years
shown tendencies of merging with computability theory - for example through the work of
Steve Smale and his many collaborators (cf. for example [2]).
5For excellent expositions of numerical and computational methods in economics, particu-
larly macroeconomics, see [3], [26] and [38].
6A complete and detailed analysis of the false claims ￿ from the point of view of com-
putability and constructivity ￿of the proponents and practitioners of CGE modelling is given
in my recent paper devoted explicitly to the topic (cf. [67]).
7Without distinguishing between microeconomics and macroeconomcis or between alterna-
tive economic theories, the discussion is as if there is an unambiguous and universally accepted
core of economic theory.
8Debreu, however, does not recognise ￿perhaps is not aware of ￿the power, suitability and
relevance of either constructive or computable analysis, for the mathematization of economic
theory. However, his above articles do invoke and rely on both real and non-standard analysis
to provide examples of the successes of necessary mathematization of fundamental aspects
of economic theory. Could this be because the mathematization of economic theory in a
constructive or computable mode might imply serious reformulations and reconsiderations of
the basic constructs of economic theory? For example, the second fundamental theorem of
welfare economics is proved by invoking the Hahn-Banach theorem, which, in the form used
in mathematical economics, is invalid in constructive analysis! Essentially, from the point of
view of the foundations of mathematics and mathematical logic, the mathematics of economic
theory that Debreu discusses is founded upon (Zermelo-Fraenkel) Set Theory (plus the axiom
of choice) and a very narrow part of Model Theory to the total neglect of Proof Theory and
Recursion Theory.
4￿albeit in a Whig mode. One way, therefore, for me to make my own story
for the mathematization of macroeconomics comparable would be to mimic the
strategy adopted by Debreu. His strategy was, in a nutshell, as follows. Debreu
identi￿ed three functions of prices in a decentralized economy ￿the function
of prices in the e¢ cient allocation of resources; prices equalizing supply and
demand; and prices acting to prevent the formation of destabilizing coalitions.
These three roles of prices, in turn, were mathematized by the use of convex
analysis (and classic non-constructive functional analysis9), ￿xed point theory
and non-standard analysis (and a version of formal integration theory)10, re-
spectively. In spite of widespread claims to the contrary, as brie￿ y mentioned in
the previous paragraph, too, the mathematics invoked to formalize these three
roles of prices cannot be algorithmized ￿i.e., cannot be made the basis of nu-
merical, computational or experimental ￿for empirical analysis, particularly for
underpinning the e¢ ciency of policy analysis using CGE models, for computing
equilibria or even for analysing the theory of competition, i.e., market structure.
In other words, if the paradigm for the mathematization of economic theory is
the one suggested by Debreu ￿and accepted by an overwhelming majority of
the profession ￿then, if followed in a story of the mathematization of macro-
economics, the same dissonance will be inevitable; the dissonance between a
mathematical theory that is non-numerical, non-computational and impossible
to implement experimentally with the use of a digital computer and the claims
and e⁄orts of numerically, computationally and experimentally oriented mathe-
matical macroeconomics that is, moreover, serious about approximation theory,
both formally and in an applied sense.
For example, two current macroeconomic examples ￿analogous to the role
attributed to prices in Debreu￿ s story ￿would be REE and dynamic program-
ming (in particular the ￿ value function￿and the ￿ Bellman equation￿ , in which
it appears). Corresponding to the above three roles of prices, there would be
the following issues to be considered in the former: the existence of REE, the
learning of REE, the dynamics of REE and the computation of REE (with the
possible approximations of REE for exact computation or, vice versa ￿i.e., ap-
proximation of the computation process for an exact REE). Each of these will
invoke a di⁄erent kind of mathematization, exactly as in the case of the three
roles of prices invoking convex analysis, functional analysis and integration the-
ory (non-standard analysis). In the case of REE it would be ￿xed point theory
(yet again!), (stochastic) approximation theory, (deterministic and stochastic)
dynamical systems theory and numerical analysis. In the case of dynamic pro-
gramming, the value function and the ￿ Bellman equation￿ , it would be almost
9In particular, duality theory in the form of the Hahn-Banach theorem, to mathematically
demonstrate the validity of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics (but, see
also the previous footnote).
10Debreu￿ s ￿ historical￿remarks accompanying these illustrations are inaccurate. For example
it is quite preposterous to state that ￿ nonstandard analysis [was] founded at the beginning
of the 1960￿ s by Abraham Robinson￿([12], p.3). There are still other surprisingly inaccurate
remarks on mathematics in the Debreu papers referenced above.
5the same: ￿x point theory, for example in the form of a contraction mapping
theorem, computation of equilibiria and approximate computation (of an exact
equilibrium) or an exact computation (of an approximate equilibrium).
Therefore, simply to maintain a comparison and for the sake of uniformity
of method, I shall follow the strategy that I have identi￿ed with Debreu,above
and shall refer to it, for want of a better name, as the ￿ orthodox methodology￿ .
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a
￿ panoramic￿and, hence, loose narrative of some issues in the development of
macroeconomics since Wicksell, mainly to make the case that any Whig history
of the subject is to be avoided. A very general methodological discussion of the
philosophy and epistemology of mathematizing macroeconomics ￿from Wicksell
to Prescott, via Samuelson, Patinkin, Clower, Lucas, Romer and Woodford. In
section 3, taking the example of the crucial role played by dynamic programming
formulations of macroeconomic decision problems, I try to describe a pattern
that conforms to the ￿ orthodox methodology￿ . In doing so, I try to keep in mind
the explicit aims of the current mathematizing enterprise in macroeconomics: a
quantitative underpinning for policy and dynamics via computational, numer-
ical and experimental analysis. In section 4, an attempt is made to make my
own contribution towards recursive macroeconomics, using the example of ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium (REE). Nothing can be more recursive, nor more
computational, than a recursion theoretic approach to proving the algorithimc
existence of, and learning, REE. The concluding section is a re￿ ection and a
retrospective of the ￿ orthodox methodology￿from the point of view of its own
avowed goals of making macroeconomics quantitative. However, the section is
also a manifesto for the correct recursive mathematization of macroeconomics,
if quantitative, numerical, computational concerns are imperative.
In general, however, there is, in any case, a close parallel between the way
economic theory was mathematized in the sense of Debreu and the mathematiza-
tion of macroeconomics. This is because the general theoretical and modelling
strategy is, on the whole, very similar: proving the existence of an equilib-
rium; if the model displays multiple equilibria - as in the case, say, of orthodox
OLG models ￿then a possible ad hoc learning algorithm to select (a subset)
of equilibria; at some point an approximation procedure to compute either the
equilibrium that has been proved to exist or to compute the (selected) equilib-
rium; the approximation procedure is also introduced in arbitrary ways ￿i.e.,
there is no clear systematic procedure guiding the perplexed graduate student to
a disciplined modelling strategy. All kinds of ￿ hand-waving￿appeals to simplic-
ity ￿pace Ockham ￿are invoked to claim the proverbial mantra: w.o.l (without
loss of generality), while the approximation linearizes something or the other.
The di⁄erence with the world of Debreu, to which allegiance is always claimed,
is that he, at least, does not profess to be driven by quantitative criteria ￿nu-
merical, computational, experimental ￿to underpin computable (sic!) policy
prescriptions to be derived via the welfare theorems11.
11Soiling the mathematical economist￿ s hands in that direction is left to the CGE theorist.
62 From Geldzins und G￿terpreise to Interest and
Prices ￿An Ultra-Brief Macroeconomic Ret-
rospect12
"To go beyond ..... to questions involving the e¢ ciency of alter-
native kinds of stabilization policy involving moving to ￿or, I would
say, beyond ￿the current frontiers of macroeconomics."
Robert E. Lucas, Jr.: Models of Business Cycles, p. 106 [34].
In March 1952, during a lecture in Stockholm, Eli Heckscher recalled, that,
on 14 April 1898, Wicksell ￿ somewhat unexpectedly revealed before the [Stock-
holm Economic] Society what was perhaps his greatest theoretical achievement,
his theory of the connection between interest rate and money value￿ . Thus
was born modern macroeconomics, a thesis to be substantiated in this research
program
It is, proverbially, a new name for an old subject. However, it was Wicksell ￿
and, to a lesser extent, Fisher - not Keynes nor Hayek, who ￿rst stamped it with
modernism in an unmistakable way ￿the modernism we associate with provid-
ing microfoundations for aggregate variables and behaviour. This he provided
for the twin horns of macroeconomics ￿the real and the monetary sides; for the
former on the basis of Austrian capital theory, which he almost single-handedly
and rigorously re-wrote and re-did for Menger, B￿hm-Bawerk and von Wieser;
for the latter, on the basis of a wholly new approach to monetary theory by
devising an innovative thought-experiment - gedankenexperiment - which obvi-
ated the need for a reliance on the quantity theory of money to explain in￿ ation.
This thought-experiment constructed a pure credit economy in which monetary
transactions were conducted in an imaginary giro system.
The crucial event that spurred him to these conceptual innovations was the
20-year de￿ ation ￿not recession ￿experienced, without exception, by all the
advanced industrial nations, from the mid-1870s to the mid-1890s. He was ￿
as Fisher was - deeply concerned that this de￿ ation meant an unwarranted re-
distribution of wealth and income between lenders and borrowers. The only
conceptual tool that was available for policy purposes was the quantity the-
ory of money. A reliance on this would have meant a further deepening of
the de￿ ationary process and an exacerbation of the unjust income and wealth
distributions. He had to devise an alternative vision of the monetary mecha-
nism in such a way that it would yield policy perspectives and tools that would
stabilize the price level, whilst preserving consistency with the microeconomics
of relative prices in a situation of de￿ationary dynamics. Thus was born the
Wicksellian (analogue of the Malthusian mechanism): the discrepancy between
the money rate of interest, determined by Banking Policy, and the natural rate
of pro￿t resulting from the capital structure of the production system. In-
12I am, of course, referring to the original German title of Wicksell￿ s classic, [68], and its
purported ￿ updating￿by Woodford, [70]. That the former wrote in German and the latter in
English is itself a testimony to the altered dominances in the profession!
7dependently, and motivated by the same events and concerns, Irving Fisher
had suggested an alternative mechanism for the interpretation and resolution
of the same problem. In a sense, modern macroeconomics is an uncoordinated
amalgam of Fisher￿ s expectational mechanism and Wicksell￿ s capital theoretic
underpinnings for monetary macroeconomic thought-experiments.
But here is a puzzle: Wicksell observes a 20-year de￿ ation and constructs an
unstable model of in￿ ation for stabilization purposes! Why has modern macro-
economics, built on Wicksellian conceptual foundations, abandoned notions of
unstable equilibria?
I believe Macroeconomists ￿notoriously ￿ckle in their allegiances and ad-
mirably unruly in their beliefs ￿are united in recognising, in Wicksell, a common
progenitor of their subject, in its modern form13. I also believe, with caveats
along lines suggested above, and a respectful nod to Irving Fisher￿ s Apprecia-
tion and Interest, [13], on one side, and to the paucity of the empirical under-
pinnings of its famous theoretical proposition(s)[23], Geldzins und G￿terpreise
is the acknowledged fountainhead of the conceptual foundations for modern
macroeconomics14.
The emergence of SDGE model as the dominant paradigm is as much due
to innovative contributions on a new synthesis of microeconomics and macro-
economics as to the uncompromising mathematization of macroeconomics. No
one questions the fact that the architects of general equilibrium theory, with the
notable exception of Menger, envisaged the subject in its mathematical mode
ab initio. This was de￿nitely not the case in macroeconomics. Macroeconomics
only gradually became a mathematical subject. Wicksell￿ s thoughts on this par-
ticular issue, expressed clearly in Geldzins und G￿terpreise, are worth recalling:
I have on this occasion made next to no use of the mathematical
method. This does not mean that I have changed my mind in regard
to its validity and applicability, but simply that my subject does not
appear to me to be ripe for methods of precision. In most other
￿elds of political economy there is unanimity concerning at least the
13Naturally, the origional Classical Economists, Smith, Ricardo and Malthus, were also
macroeocnomists, in almost every sense in which the subject is practised today, except, per-
haps, in its fundamental commitment to microfoundations.
14Prescott in an interview, soon after receiving his Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic
Science, in December, 2004, had this interesting remark about Wicksell as a progenitor ([49],
p.5):
"By the way, it turns out our real-shock story is an old one ￿Knut Wicksell and
Arthur Cecil Pigou were famous economists who adhered to that view. Ijust
got a little note from Paul Samuelson telling me to look at Wicksell, so I got
Wicksell￿ s book out of the library."
I do wonder which of Wicksell￿ s works was singled out by Paul Samuelson. Surely, Samuel-
son, scholar par excellence that he is, would have been more speci￿c about which of the great
Wicksell￿ s works would be relevant for an RBC interpretation? Remarkably, it does seem that
Prescott had never read Wicksell before the note arrived from Samuelson! I suspect those of us
trying to ride two horses ￿a respect for our intellectual heritage and a mastery of theoretical
technology ￿will forever remain Neanderthals, at least because time will not be on our side
to do both adequately fast enough for Stockholm to .....!!
8direction in which one cause or another reacts on economic processes;
the next step must then lie in an attempt to introduce more precise
quantitative relations. But in the subject to which this book is
devoted the dispute still rages about plus as opposed to minus.￿
[68], p. xxx; italics in original.
At the frontiers of macroeconomics the conscious Wicksellian vision of the
foundations of monetary policy is encapsulated, within a squarely SDGE mod-
elling framework, by Woodford￿ s massive work titled, as Richard Kahn￿ s (in-
complete) translation of the title of the Wicksellian opus: Interest & Prices
(perhaps in homage to Wicksell!). The di⁄erence in economic content between
the two books, especially if Wicksell￿ s classic is supplemented by the later works
of his Swedish followers, Lindahl and Myrdal in particular, is signi￿cant, but
not too dramatic that a latter-day incarnation of Wicksell will not be able to
read, appreciate and even agree with (at least parts of it). I think Wicksell
would wholly endorse the relentless mathematization of the subject he almost
single-handedly founded.
However, the contrast in the analytical methods is dramatic; the Wicksellian
scepticism, captured in the quote above, has been banished beyond doubt. How
did this happen? When did it happen? Why did it happen? Was it inevitable
that it would happen?
Without answering these question, telling the story of the mathematiza-
tion of macroeconomics as if a Whig historian would say it, will not be able
to make sense of ￿ roads not taken￿of the following type. Myrdal￿ s Monetary
Equilibrium ([40]), together with Lindhal￿ s classics ([30], [31]), the classic on
the theory of economic policy by Myrdal ([39])15, the Keynesian magnum opus
([27]) and Hayek￿ s three pioneering contributions ([20], [21] and [22]) were the
fountainheads for the concepts that came to underpin the macroeconomic basis
of newclassical economics, especially in its codi￿cation via SDGE modelling:
intertemporal equilibrium, rational expectations, monetary equilibrium, credibil-
ity of policy, time inconsistency, policy invariance, etc. Only the concept of
the ￿ natural rate￿ , applied to the labour market, was obviously absent. But the
Monetary Equilibrium de￿ned by Myrdal was for a cumulative process that was
an unstable and (stochastically) non-stationary dynamic process16. Moreover,
Myrdal (and Lindahl) were explicit in di⁄erentiating, conceptually and ana-
lytically, a monetary equilibrium from the general equilibrium (of a Walrasian
15Still available only in the Swedish original ￿indeed, only in its version as a Government
memorandum ￿although made a part of the folklore of the classical framework of the theory
of economic policy by Ragnar Frisch, Bent Hansen and Jan Tinbergen, in the eraly post-war
years.
16
￿Our central statement of the problem .. is .. the following: From the
standpoint of the fundamental idea of Wicksell￿ s monetary theory, what do the
properties of a price situation in a non-stationary course of events have to be in
order that this situation can be characterized as a position of monetary equilib-
rium.￿Myrdal, op.cit, p.42; italics added.
9system)17:
￿This monetary equilibrium, which is stated precisely with re-
spect to a certain accrual or hypothetical price situation, has by no
means the same character as the conditions of perfect general equi-
librium of prices in the static analysis of price formation. Wicksell
emphasised this.￿
op.cit., p. 35.
How did these considerations get subverted and replaced by the SDGE mod-
elling framework of stationary, stable, stochastic dynamic processes with the
Walrasian equilibrium as the benchmark? I do not believe there is any other
way to account for this impoverishment of economic insight than by understand-
ing the mathematization of macroeconomics. This is not an isolated episode of
impoverishment of economic insight in the process of the mathematization of
macroeconomics. Similar episodes happened at crucial forks in the development
of mathematical macroeconomics in business cycle theory, monetary theory (and
growth theory).
On the other hand, there are also edifying episodes in the emergence of math-
ematical macroeconomics where the lack of, or ignorance of, theoretical tech-
nologies stunted the development of articulated theories. The particular case
of Robertson￿ s theory of the cycle, ￿rst formulated in 1915 and then ￿nessed
in the context of an innovative monetary policy framework consistent with that
being developed by Wicksell￿ s followers in Sweden, is paradigmatic. Robertson￿ s
theory of the business cycle is RBC theory in embryo. However, Robertson￿ s
theory was no match for the emerging, endogenous, Keynesian theories of the
cycle, where powerful non-linear mathematical theories were harnessed to en-
capsulate the multiplier-accelerator model. The full force of the mathematically
formal RBC theory was required to challenge the dominance of the endogenous
theory and, in the process, install the SDGE modelling strategy as the canonical
model of mathematical macroeconomics. Such a re-formalization of Robertson￿ s
equilibrium, real, theory of the business cycle can easily enrich RBC theory by
allowing the monetary ￿in fact, banking ￿principles to which the former was
attached, to be incorporated in the latter with the powerful theoretical tech-
nologies now at hand. This is in line with a neo-Wicksellian synthesis that can
enrich, also, the foundations of monetary policy in technically more interesting
and realistic ways ￿those that were intrinsic to the original cumulative process:
17Leijonhufvud ([29], p.155; italics in the original), on the other hand, popularised the dia-
metrically opposite view (perhaps thereby, inadvertently, in￿uencing Woodford to propagate
the same vision):
"The central concepts of Wicksell￿ s analytical apparatus are, of course, the mar-
ket rate and the natural rate of interest. The terms are names for two values of
the same variable."
Nowhere in the Wicksellian classics, nor in any of the monetary macroeconomic writings of
Lindahl or Myrdal have I found any evidence to substantiate this assertion.
10instability, stochastic non-stationarity circumscribed by an equilibrium dynamic
process.
The irony in this particular case is that monetary theory and the founda-
tions of monetary policy were the impetus for the creation of the subject of
macroeconomics in the imaginative hands of Wicksell. However, with the emer-
gence of SDGE modelling as the canonical method, it is business cycle theory,
buttressed by growth theory, that act as the foundations of macroeconomics;
monetary theory and the foundations of monetary policy are handmaidens to
the benchmark that is provided by the SDGE. Paradoxically, however, this re-
versal of roles can be justi￿ed on Wicksellian grounds, as well . In other words,
the mathematization of macroeconomics had a natural development towards
placing business cycle theory at its core simply because the focus on dynamics
was most natural in that setting.
One ￿nal methodological issue must be mentioned. The developments in the
mathematization of macroeconomics, particularly at the hands of Lucas, Sargent
and Kydland & Prescott, called forth also a fresh look at what had become stan-
dard econometric practice: the Cowles Foundation Methodology, and revived the
old debate between Rutledge Vining and Tjalling Koopmans. If the preoccu-
pation was with Keynesian ghosts and their slaying during the consolidation
of the canonical newclassical macroeconomic model, then this ￿ After-Keynesian
Macroeconomics￿period can almost, be said to characterize the slaying of the
scepter of the Cowles Foundation Methodologies. Once again, new metaphors
were forged and new concepts invented, foremost among them being the compu-
tational, numerical, approximation theoretic and recursive metaphors, in almost
every macroeconomic corner. This, in turn, has led to new perspectives on ac-
counting categories, as well.
In telling this kind of story of the mathematization of the subject, it also
provides coherence to a narrative of a ￿ century of macroeconomic theory￿ , which
is no longer a story of competing schools of thought; nor one of Whig history.
3 Recursive Macroeconomics and Dynamic Pro-
gramming: Possibilities and Impossibilities
"The recursive competitive equilibrium is particularly convenient
.... because it ￿ts naturally into the dynamic programming approach
to solving optimization problems."
Thomas Cooley & Edward Prescott: ￿ Economic Growth and Business Cy-
cles￿ , ch. 1, p.9, in: [7].
This is a typical Debreu-type approach to the mathematization of macro-
economics. An equilibrium concept seems to have been de￿ned, the Recursive
Competitive Equilibrium (RCE), with a particular mathematical construct in
mind ￿in this case, dynamic programming; just as the role of prices equilibrat-
ing supply and demand was transformed into a ￿x point problem to facilitate
11a speci￿c kind of mathematization of economic theory18. Thereby, the original
and historical approach to the problem of supply-demand equilibrium was lost
and ￿x point theory became the bread & butter mathematical technique and
framework for almost every equilibrium problem in economics19.
The RCE concept emerged via the particular macroeconomic exercise of
modelling economies experiencing balanced growth as dynamic general equi-
librium descriptions. Unlike the original motivation for the Arrow-Debreu ap-
proach to the mathematization of a Walrasian Equilibrium20, the RCE was, ab
initio, justi￿ed on grounds of computation, simulation, policy analysis and other
quantitative issues.
Moreover, the RCE construct for SDGE modelling provides a direct link
with the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics and grounds a par-
ticularly powerful mathematization of macroeconomics in core mathematical
economic theory. Theory, computation, simulation, approximation and pol-
icy seem all to be seamlessly knit together in a rich tapestry of mathematical
macroeconomics in this approach. Let us see.
We imagine a representative agent economy, with preferences that are ad-
ditively separable and de￿ned over consumption at every date in a discrete
18A comparison with Paul Romer￿ s vision on this methodological issue seems to show that he
was slightly less than prescient! In Romer￿ s view it was merely a dynamic general equilibrium
model (DGE) which was to rely entirely on static optimization techniques ([52], p. 70-1;
italics added):
""Growth is a general equilibrium process. ... A growth theorist must there-
fore construct a dynamic general equilibrium model, starting with a speci￿ca-
tion of preferences and the technology and specifying an equilibrium concept.
......Either explicitly or implicitly, the central tool used in the characterization
of dynamic competitive equilibrium models is the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. It of-
fers a general procedure for reducing the problem of calculating a competitive
equilibrium to the problem of solving maximization problems."
It does nothing of the sort! But explicating that will require a whole monograph on com-
putability theory.
19It took an outsider, a distinguished mathematician and a ￿ part-time￿mathematical econo-
mist, Steve Smale, to point out that the proverbial ￿ emperor￿was less than well clad:
"We return to the subject of equilibrium theory. The existence theory of
the static approach is deeply rooted to the use of the mathematics of ￿xed
point theory. Thus one step in the liberation from the static point of view
would be to use a mathematics of a di⁄erent kind. Furthermore, proofs of ￿xed
point theorems traditionally use di¢ cult ideas of algebraic topology, and this has
obscured the economic phenomena underlying the existence of equilibria. Also
the economic equilibrium problem presents itself most directly and with the
most tradition not as a ￿xed point problem, but as an equation, supply equals
demand. Mathematical economists have translated the problem of solving this
equation into a ￿xed point problem.
I think it is fair to say that for the main existence problems in the theory
of economic equilibrium, one can now bypass the ￿xed point approach and at-
tack the equations directly to give existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of
mathematics and even mathematics with dynamic and algorithmic overtones."
[58], p.290; bold emphasis added.
20Where the issue of the computability of a Walrasian equilibirum was an ex post construct,






tU (ct); 0 < ￿ < 1 (1)
where:
U 2 C1 : <+ ! <; strictly concave, increasing and limc!0 = 1:
The aggregate production function is22:
Yt = F (Kt;Ht) (2)
where:
K0 : initial endowment of capital
Kt : household supply of period t capital to ￿rms;
Ht : household supply of period t labour to ￿rms;
F satis￿es the Inada conditions w.r.t H and K; and F 2 C1, increasing and
concave w.r.t K and H and is homogeneous of degree one.
The aggregate resource constraint is:
Ct + Kt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt ￿ F (Kt;Ht); 8t (3)
Now, assuming that this is a problem to be solved by one of those mythical
creatures ￿with which economics is richly endowed, the Walrasian Auctioneer
being the prime example ￿the so-called benevolent social planner, and that no
output is ￿ wasted￿ , thereby converting the aggregate resource constraint, (3), to







tU [f (Kt) ￿ Kt+1]
s:t 0 ￿ Kt+1 ￿ f (Kt); t = 0;::::: and given K0 > 0 (4)
The mathematization of macroeconomics that I am focusing on ￿parallel-
ing the Debreu approach, to keep emphasising ￿is how this ￿ traditional￿and
very standard optimization problem was transformed, in the new matehamtical
macroeconomics into a recursive form so that it can be solved by dynamic pro-
gramming. The benevolent social planners task is then represented as a classic
21I follow, in the sequel, the standard expositions in [7] and [36] and concentrate on the
deterministic optimal growth case. The stochastic case is, of course, a straightforward analog
and only requires minor notational and conceptual ￿nessing. However, the full generality of
the stochastic case is, in my opinion, most illuminatingly treated in [37], chapter 7.
22Of course, the implications of the ￿ Cambridge Controversies in Capital Theory￿ have
passed over the current generation of mathematical macroeconomists like water o⁄ of a duck￿ s
back ￿or even worse, [50], p. 523; italics added:
"In the 1960s there was the famous Cambridge capital controversy. This contro-
versy bears on the issue ￿ What is money?￿ The Cambridge capital controversy
was a silly one, as pointed out so clearly by Arrow.. . .￿
13dynamic programming problem in terms of the Bellman equation (or the func-
tional equation) and the value function, V , as (writing the production function
in its intensive form):
V (K0) =
max
0 ￿ K1 ￿ f (K0)
fU [f (K0) ￿ K1] + ￿V (K1)g (5)
This can be rewritten, purely formally, in per capita and intensive forms, as:
V (k) =
max
0 ￿ y ￿ f (k)
fU [f (k) ￿ y] + ￿v (y)g (6)
Remark 1 From the functional equation we can derive an analogue of the Euler
equations and, thus, ￿ return￿to the Ramsey marginal conditions23. Thus, if v is
assumed to be di⁄erentiable and if the maximizing value of y, say v￿ (k) was an
interior value, then:
U0 [f (k) ￿ v￿ (k)] = ￿v0 [v￿ (k)] (7)
v0 (k) = f0 (k)U0 [f (k) ￿ v￿ (k)]
The above formulation is the optimum allocation problem of our benevolent
social planner. To be able to interpret the solution to the ￿ centralized planned
economy￿dynamic programming problem (5) (or (6)) as the solution brought
about by a competitive, decentralized, market economy, one invokes the funda-
mental theorems of welfare economics, thereby exploiting the much ￿ maligned￿
relationship between Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria (and, thus, un-
derpinning this alleged macroeconomic framework in solid microeconomic foun-
dations). The ￿rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics enables the con-
clusion that any (decentralized) competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto
23The knowledgeable, discerning reader will recall Ramsey￿ s explanatory note immediately
after deriving his famous result ([51], p.547):
"Mr Keynes, to whom I am indebted for several other suggestions, has shown
me that this result can also be obtained by the following simple reasoning."
Those, like me, who are deeply disturbed by the ahistorical scholarship of the stalwarts of
Newclassical economics and wince at their ignorant pronouncements, will like to recall this
handsome acknowledgement to Keynes by one of the greatest logicians and mathematicians of
the 20th Century. In saying this, and remembering that just Cambridge at the time of Keynes
was richly endowed with greatness in mathematics, mathematical physics, mathematical logic
and applied mathematics ￿G.H. Hardy, Bertrand Russell, A.N. Whitehead, Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, Harold Je⁄reys, Paul Dirac, Arthur Eddington, Lord Rutherford, J.E. Litlewood, A.S.
Besicovich and legions of others. How, then, can Lucas make the following preposterous
suggestion ([35], p.149; italics added):
When Marshall was educated, and even when Keynes was educated, England
was a mathematical backwater. If they had been educated in France, Germany
or Russia, working with people like Kolmogorov, Borel or Cantor, they would
have thought di⁄erently. Walras, Pareto and Slutzky thought di⁄erently. The
people who were giving birth to mathematical economics were mainly on the
continent at that time.￿
Were they, indeed? And were they taught in the traditions that were fostered by Cantor
and Borel; Kolmogorov and Andronov; Volterra and Cantelli; etc?
14Optimal; conversely, the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics sup-
ports the mythical benevolent social planner￿ s Pareto Optimal allocation as a
competitive equilibrium24. In other words, the price system associated with
the latter can support the optimal allocation derived by the former. To obtain,
therefore, the necessary (decentralized) competitive price system, we revert to
the framework of the individual agent￿ s decision problem.









pt [ct + Kt+1] ￿
1 X
t=0
pt [wt + (rt + 1 ￿ ￿)Kt] (8)
ct ￿ 0; Kt+1 ￿ 0





[￿ ￿ U0 (ct+1)]
(9)
Similarly, from the ￿rm￿ s analogous decision problem:
max
Kt;Ht
pt ￿ [F (Kt;Ht) ￿ rtKt ￿ wtHt]; 8t (10)
we get, again from the FOCs, 8t; the optimum values for the real wage rate,
wt and the real rate of return on capital, rt, respectively:
wt = F2 (Kt;Ht) (11)
rt = F1 (Kt;Ht) (12)
Now, to transform the above standard formulation of the household and
￿rm decision problems to a dynamic programming formulation, denote by lower
case letters those variables over which an individual household has immediate
control; upper case letters for variables that are their aggregate counterparts.
Thus, for example: k is an individual households capital stock; and K is the
economy-wide per capita capital stock. In equilibrium, of course, K = k: Thus
the state variables for the individual households are the pair (k;K):Then, denote
by v (k;K); the individual households optimum value function; and, if primes
denote values one period later, the households dynamic programming decision
problem will be to choose a path for investment, say x; and consumption c, that
24Surely, Hayek, Robbins, von Mises, Lange and other participants of the much-debated





fu(c) + ￿v [k0;K0]
s:t c + x ￿ r(K)k + w(K)
k0 = (1 ￿ ￿)k + x
K0 = (1 ￿ ￿)K + X (K) (13)
Suppose d(k;K) is the optimal policy function; since this is a representative
agent economy, this implies: d(k;K) = D(K), in equilibrium. Then:
De￿nition 2 A Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (RCE), (v;d;D;r;w), is
characterized by the following set of conditions:
1. a value function v (k;K) : <
+
2 ! <;
2. a policy function d(k;K) : <
+
2 ! <+ giving decisions on c(k;K) and
x(k;K);
3. analogous to d(k;K) above, an aggregate policy function D(K) :
<+ ! <+; giving the aggregate decisions, C (K) and D(K);respectively;
4. factor price functions, r(K) and w(K);both <+ ! <+, satisfying,
(13), (11)￿ (12, the aggregate resource constraint and the consistency be-
tween the individual and aggregate decisions25.
Remark 3 If (v;d;D;r;w) is a RCE, then an implication of the second fun-
damental theorem of welfare economics is that v (k;K) = V (K):
The power this particular dynamic extension of the traditional equilibrium
concept plays a signi￿cant role in the mathematized macroeconomy is best de-
scribed in the words of two of the frontier practitioners of the subject:
"Another great advantage of the RCE approach is that for an
increasingly rich class of model economies, the equilibrium process
can be computed and can be simulated to generate equilibrium paths
for the economy. These paths can be studied to see whether model
economies mimic the behavior of actual economies and can be used
to provide quantitative answers to questions of economic welfare."
[7], p.9; italics added.
A brief re￿ ection on the foundations of computable general equilibrium, at
this point, may make this apparently laudable aim more clear. The real power
of a formal CGE model, from a computational point of view, relies entirely
on Uzawa￿ s Equivalence Theorem (cf.[61], chapter 11). It is this theorem that
25There is no question of the fallacy of composition driving a wedge between individual and
aggregate decisions in this kind of macroeconomics!
16proves the formal equivalence between a Walrasian Equilibrium Existence The-
orem and the Brouwer (or Kakutani) Fix Point Theorem. This equivalence
enables any computational process ￿i.e., an algorithm ￿constructed for com-
puting a Brouwer ￿x point gives also the Walrasian (Exchange) Equilibrium.
Roles analogous to the Uzawa Equivalence Theorem are played, in the above
claims by Cooley and Prescott, particularly when, at the stage of policy analysis,
e¢ ciency propositions are also imputed to the processes.
Now, there are three problems with these claims and aims. First of all, and
trivially, no where in the literature on mathematical economics, mathematical
macroeconomics or even in formal computability theory is there any proposition
on the e¢ ciency of processes; in fact, it is quite easy to show that the dynamic
programming formulation above, for the RCE, is, in fact computationally in-
tractable in a precise sense. Secondly, neither the ￿rst nor the second welfare
theorems are computationally feasible in the precise senses of computability
theory and constructive analysis. Thirdly, the approximation procedures used,
in computing the relevant RCE are provable intractable, simply because the
equilibrium is uncomputable!
I shall only deal with the second of these infelicities in this paper. Companion
pieces to this work tackle the whole set of issues more systematically.
The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics asserts the
that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. A textbook formulation of the
theorem is as follows ([61], p. 145):
Theorem 4 Assume Weak monotonicity and continuity of preferences; Let
p￿ 2 <N
+ be a competitive equilibrium price vector of the economy. Let !0i,
i 2 H, be he associated individual consumption bundles, and let y0j, j 2 F;be
the associated ￿rm supply vectors. Then !0i is Pareto e¢ cient.
where:
F : set of ￿rms.
Proof. See [61], p. 145-6.
Remark 5 The theorem is proved non-constructively, using an uncomputable
equilibrium price vector to compute an equilibrium allocation. Therefore, the
contradiction step in the proof requires a comparison between an uncomputable
allocation and an arbitrary allocation, for which no computable allocation can
be devised. Moreover, the theorem assumes the intermediate value theorem in
its non-constructive form. Finally, even if the equilibrium price vector is com-
putable, the contradiction step in the proof invokes the law of the excluded middle
and is, therefore, unacceptable constructively (because it requires algorithmically
undecidable disjunctions to be employed in the decision procedure).
The Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem establishes the proposition that
any Pareto optimum can, for suitably chosen prices, be supported as a competi-
tive equilibrium. The role of the Hahn-Banach theorem in this proposition is in
establishing the suitable price system.
17Lucas and Stokey state ￿ their￿version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem in the
following way26:
Theorem 6 Geometric form of the Hahn-Banch Theorem.
Let S be a normed vector space; let A;B ￿ S be convex sets. Assume:
(a). Either B has an interior point and A \ ￿ B = ;,
￿
￿ B : closure of B
￿
;
(b). Or, S is ￿nite dimensional and A \ B = ;;
Then: 9 a continuous linear functional ￿, not identically zero on S; and a
constant c s.t:
￿(y) ￿ c ￿ ￿(x); 8x 2 A and 8y 2 B:
Next, I state the economic part of the problem in merciless telegraphic form
as follows:
There areI consumers, indexed i = 1;::::;I;
S is a vector space with the usual norm;
Consumer i chooses from commodity set Xi ￿ S, evaluated according to the
utility function ui : Xi ! <;
There are j ￿rms, indexed j = 1;::::;J;
Choice by ￿rm j is from the technology possibility set, Yj ￿ S; (evaluated
along pro￿t maximizing lines);
The mathematical structure is represented by the following absolutely stan-
dard assumptions:
1. 8i;Xi is convex;
2. 8i; if x;x0 2 Ci;ui(x) > ui(x0); and if ￿ 2 (0;1); then ui [￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)x0] >
ui(x0);
3. 8i;ui : Xi ! < is continuous;
4. The set Y =
P
j Yj is convex;
5. Either the set Y =
P
j Yj has an interior point, or S is ￿nite dimensional;
Then, the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is:











Optimal allocation; assume, for some h 2
￿￿ 1;:::::￿ I
￿
;9^ xh 2 Xh with uh(^ xh) >
uh(x0
h): Then 9 a continuous linear functional ￿ : S ! <; not identically zero
on S, s.t:
(a). 8i;x 2 Xi and ui(x) ￿ ui(x0) =) ￿(x) ￿ ￿(x0
i);
(b). 8j;y 2 Yj =) ￿(j) ￿ ￿(y0
i );
26Essentially, the ￿ classical￿mathematician￿ s Hahn-Banach theorem guarantees the exten-
sion of a bounded linear functional, say ￿, from a linear subset Y of a separable normed linear
space, X, to a functional, ￿; on the whole space X, with exact preservation of norm; i.e.,
j￿j = j￿j. The constructive Hahn-Banach theorem, on the other hand, cannot deliver this
pseudo-exactness and preserves the extension as: j￿j ￿ j￿j+", 8" > 0: The role of the positive
" in the constructive version of the Hahn-Banach theorem is elegantly discussed by Nerode,
Metakides and Constable in their beautiful piece in the Bishop Memorial Volume ([42], pp.
85-91). Again, compare the di⁄erence between the ￿ classical￿IVT and the constructive IVT
to get a feel for the role of ":
18Anyone can see, as anyone would have seen and has seen for the last 70
years, that an economic problem has been ￿ mangled￿into a mathematical form
to conform to the structure and form of a mathematical theorem. But this is
standard practice, as we saw in Debreu￿ s examples in section 1, for practitioners
of the ￿ orthodox methodology￿ ..
It is a pure mechanical procedure to verify that the assumptions of the
economic problem satisfy the conditions of the Hahn-Banach Theorem and,
therefore, the powerful Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics is
￿ proved￿ 27.
The Hahn-Banach theorem does have a constructive version, but only on
subspaces of separable normed spaces. The standard, ￿ classical￿version, valid
on nonseparable normed spaces depends on Zorn￿ s Lemma which is, of course,
equivalent to the axiom of choice, and is therefore, non-constructive28.
Schechter￿ s perceptive comment on the constructive Hahn-Banach theorem is
the precept I wish economists with a numerical, computational or experimental
bent should keep in mind (ibid, p. 135; italics in original; emphasis added).:
"[O]ne of the fundamental theorems of classical functional analysis
is the Hahn-Banach Theorem; ... some versions assert the existence
of a certain type of linear functional on a normed space X. The
theorem is inherently nonconstructive, but a constructive proof can
be given for a variant involving normed spaces X that are separable
￿i.e., normed spaces that have a countable dense subset. Little is
lost in restricting one￿ s attention to separable spaces29, for in applied
math most or all normed spaces of interest are separable. The con-
structive version of the Hahn-Banach Theorem is more complicated,
but it has the advantage that it actually ￿nds the linear functional
in question."
So, one may be excused for wondering, why economists rely on the ￿ classical￿
versions of these theorems? They are devoid of numerical meaning and compu-
tational content. Why go through the rigmarole of ￿rst formalizing in terms of
numerically meaningless and computationally invalid concepts to then seek im-
possible and intractable approximations to determine uncomputable equilibria,
undecidably e¢ cient allocations, and so on?
Thus my question is: why should an economist force the economic domain
to be a normed vector space? Why not a separable normed vector space? Isn￿ t
27To the best of my knowledge an equivalence between the two, analogous to that between
the Brouwer ￿x point theorem and the Walrasian equilibrium existence theorem, proved by
Uzawa ([65]), has not been shown.
28This is not a strictly accurate statement, although this is the way many advanced books
on functional analysis tend to present the Hahn-Banach theorem. For a reasonably accessible
discussion of the precise dependency of the Hahn-Banach theorem on the kind of axiom of
choice (i.e., whether countable axiom of choice or the axiom of dependent choice), see [41].
For an even better and fuller discussion of the Hahn-Banach theorem, both from ￿ classical￿
and a constructive points of view, Schechter￿ s encyclopedic treatise is unbeatable ([56]).
29However, it must be remembered that Ishihara, [24], has shown the constructive validity
of the Hahn-Banach theorem also for uniformly convex spaces.
19this because of pure ignorance of constructive mathematics and a carelessness
about the nature and scope of fundamental economic entities and the domain
over which they should be de￿ned?
On the other hand, the ￿rst fundamental theorem of welfare economics fails
constructively and computably on three grounds: the dependence on the in-
termediate value theorem (non-constructive), the use of an uncomputable equi-
libirum price vector in the proof by contradiction (uncomputability) and the
use of the law of the excluded middle in the proof by contradiction (non-
constructivity).
Under these conditions, the equilibrium of the canonical SDGE model, RCE,
cannot, in any formal algorithmic sense be e⁄ectively or constructively com-
puted; therefore, no equilibrium process can e⁄ectively be determined to show
convergence to a balanced growth path.
Finally, the mathematical structure of the space on which the value function
and the policy function are de￿ned is such that the existence of a ￿x point for
the contraction operator that is invoked is non-algorithmizable. This is because
Cauchy Completeness is assumed for the space over which the contraction is
implemented. But Cauchy Completeness, stated as:
Theorem 8 Every Cauchy sequence in R converges to an element of R
This theorem is, in turn, proved using the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem,
which contains an unconstructi￿able - i.e., non-algorithmic and hence impossible
to utilise in a consistent ￿ computational experiment￿- undecidable disjunction
in its proof!
In other words, the computational program of mathematizing macroeco-
nomics by formulating optimal decision problems as dynamic programming
problems is impossible.
4 Recursive30 Rational Expectations Equilibria
"In dynamic contexts, we formulate a rational expectations equi-
librium as a ￿xed point in a space of sequences of prices and quan-
tities, or, equivalently, a ￿xed point in a space of functions that
determine sequences of prices and quantities."
Thomas J. Sargent: Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics, p.8,
[55]; italics in the original.
Thereby, hangs the same tale! Existence of a rational expectations equilib-
rium (REE) is established using a ￿x point theorem. Such a theorem is com-
pletely formal, without a shred of algorithmic content. Therefore, additional ad
hoc algorithmic mechanisms and theories have to be constructed for learning
the REE that has been proved to exist purely formally. One might be excused
30Here, for once, I am able to refer to ￿ recursive￿in the sense of ￿ recursion theory￿ .
20for wondering, at this stage, and given the aims of the mathemtizing enterprise
of macroeconomics that we have identi￿ed as being quantitative in the sense of
computational, numerical and experimental economics, why the theorist does
not algorithmize the proof, ab initio! Then, a separate and ad hoc learning
mechanism to determine the REE will not have to be devised.
To suggest a remedy to this infelicity, I tackle two issues pertaining to REE
from a purely recursion theoretic point of view, where such dichotomies are
never present. Anything proved to exist, in a recursion theoretic framework,
comes, pari passu, with an algorithm to compute it. In the ￿rst part of this
section, building on Spear￿ s early work (cf. [60]31), a recursion theoretic learning
mechanism is suggested. The second part is a more direct attack on the problem
of the existence of REE.
There are two crucial aspects to the notion of REE, ([55], pp.6-10): an in-
dividual optimization problem, subject to perceived constraints, and a system
wide, autonomous, set of constraints imposing consistency across the collection
of the perceived constraints of the individuals. The latter would be, in a most
general sense, the accounting constraint, generated autonomously, by the logic
of the macroeconomic system. In a representative agent framework the deter-
mination of REEs entails the solution of a general ￿x point problem. Suppose
the representative agent￿ s perceived law of motion of the macroeconomic system
(as a function of state variables and exogenous ￿ disturbances￿ ) as a whole is
given by the (topological) map H32. The system wide autonomous set of con-
straints, implied, partially at least, by the optimal decisions based on perceived
constraints by the agents, on the other hand, imply an actual law of motion
given by, say, H0. The search for ￿xed-points of a mapping, T, linking the
individually perceived macroeconomic law of motion, H, and the actual law of
motion, H0 is assumed to be given by a general functional relationship subject
to the standard mathematical assumptions:
H0 = T(H) (14)
Thus, the ￿xed-points of H￿ of T33:
H￿ = T(H￿) (15)
determine REEs.
What is the justi￿cation for T? What kind of ￿ object￿is it? It is variously
referred to as a ￿ reaction function￿ , a ￿ best response function￿ , a ￿ best response
mapping￿ , etc. But whatever it is called, eventually the necessary mathematical
assumptions are imputed to it such that it is amenable to a topological inter-
pretation whereby appeal can be made to the existence of a ￿x-point for it as
31Spear￿ s contribution is riddled with technical infelicities that display quie a comprehensive
ignorance of even classical recursion theory. How it came to be published in the Econometrica
should be an interesting study in the sociology of peer-reviewed publications!
32Readers familiar with the literature will recognise that the notation H re￿ects the fact
that, in the underlying optimisation problem, a Hamiltonian function has to be formed.
33In a space of functions.
21a mapping from a structured domain into itself. So far as I know, there is no
optimizing economic theoretical justi￿cation for it.
Now let me go behind the scenes, so to speak, and take one of the many
possible economic worlds in which T operates, a simple Overlapping Generation
Model (OLG), with standard assumptions, which generates REEs as solutions
to the following type of functional dynamic equation (cf. [1], pp. 414-6):













u and v are functional notations for the additive utility functions;







The real per capita currency balances, mt = Mt
ptLt;
Lt : size of generation t (a discrete random variable with standard assump-
tions);
Mt : aggregate stock of currency;
pt : realized price (of the one consumption good);
pt+1 : future price (random variable);
et : endowment at time t;
It : information set de￿ned by
It = I fIt￿1;Lt￿1;xt￿1;pt￿1;￿tg (17)
￿t : vector of all other residual variables that the agent believes will in￿ uence
future prices;
The problem I pose is the devising of an e⁄ective mechanism to learn and
identify the above REE solution. However, it is immediately clear that one must
￿rst ensure that the solution is itself a recursive real, if an e⁄ective mechanism
is to locate it. A priori, and except for ￿ ukes, it is most likely that the standard
solution will be a non-recursive real. To make it possible, therefore, to ensure
a recursively real solution to the above functional dynamic equation, this OLG
structure must be endowed with an appropriate recursion theoretic basis. I
shall, now, indicate a possible set of minimum requirements for the required
recursion theoretic basis.
The derivative of the second period component of the additive utility func-
tion, v, must be a computable real function. Roughly speaking, if the domain of
v is chosen judiciously and if v 2 C2, and computable, then v0 is computable.
But, for these to be acceptable assumptions, the arguments of v0;i.e., e2;mt+1;
and
Lt+1
Lt ; must be computable reals. Since this is straightforward for e2 and
per capita currency balances34,mt+1, a recursion theoretic interpretation for the
random variable Lt will ensure that the assumptions underlying v0 are recur-
sion theoretically sound. Now, the random variables in the OLG model above
are characterized by ￿nite means and stationary probability distributions. It
34Provided we assume a straightforward recursive structure for prices, which turns out,
usually, to be natural.
22is, therefore, easy to construct a Probabilistic Turing Machine, PTM, endowed
with an extra random-bit generator which outputs, whenever necessary, the nec-
essary element that has the pre-assigned probability distribution. Next, there
is the question of the recursivity of the information set, It. Given that a re-
cursion theoretic learning model requires this information set to be recursively
presented to the agents, it is only the element ￿t that remains to be recursively
de￿ned. However, this is a purely exogenous variable that can be endowed with
the required recursive structure almost arbitrarily.
Finally, the expectations operator is interpreted as an integration process
and, since integration is a computable process, this completes the necessary en-
dowment of the elements of the above OLG model with a su¢ cient recursive
structure to make the REE generated by the solution to the functional equa-
tion a recursive real. The minor caveat ￿ su¢ cient recursive structure￿is to guard
against any misconception that this is the only way to endow the elements of
an OLG model as given above with the required assumptions to guarantee the
generation of a recursive real as a solution. There are many ways to do so
but I have chosen this particular mode because it seems straightforward and
simple. Above all, these assumptions do not contradict any of the standard as-
sumptions and can live with almost all of them, with minor and inconsequential
modi￿cations.
With this machinery at hand, I can state and prove the following theorem:
Theorem 9 A unique, recursively real, solution to (16) can be identi￿ed as the
REE and learned recursively.
Proof. See [66], pp. 98-9.
Remark 10 The theorem is about recursive learning; nevertheless it does em-
body an unpleasant epistemological implication: there is no e⁄ective way for
the learning agent to know when to stop applying the learning mechanism! More-
over, nothing in the assumptions guarantee tractable computability at any stage.
Going back to T; clearly there is nothing sacrosanct about a topological
interpretation of such an operator. It could equally well be interpreted recursion
theoretically, which is what I shall do in the sequel. I need some unfamiliar,
but elementary, formal machinery, not routinely available to the mathematical
economist.
De￿nition 11 An operator is a function:
￿ : Fm ￿! Fn (18)
where Fk (k = 1) is the class of all partial (recursive) functions from Nk to
N.
De￿nition 12 ￿ is a recursive operator if there is a computable function ￿
such that 8f 2 Fm and x 2 Nm, y 2 N :





where35 e ￿ is a standard coding of a ￿nite function ￿; which is extended by
f.
De￿nition 13 An operator ￿ : Fm ￿! Fn is continuous if, for any f 2 Fm;
and 8x;y:
￿(f)(x) ’ y iff 9 a finite ￿ v f such that ￿(￿)(x) ’ y
De￿nition 14 An operator ￿ : Fm ￿! Fn is monotone if, whenever f;g 2
Fm and f v g, then ￿(f) v ￿(g):
Theorem 15 A recursive operator is continuous and monotone.
Example 16 Consider the following recursive program, ￿ ,(also a recursive
operator) over the integers:
￿: F (x;y) (= if x = y then y + 1, else F (x;F (x ￿ 1;y + 1))
Now replace each occurrence of F in ￿ by each of the following functions:
f1 (x;y) : if x = y then y + 1; else x + 1 (19)
f2 (x;y) : if x = y then x + 1; else y ￿ 1 (20)
f3 (x;y) : if (x = y) ^ (x ￿ y even) then x + 1; else undefined: (21)
Then, on either side of (= in ￿, we get the identical partial functions:
8i(1 5 i 5 3); fi (x;y) ￿ if x = y then y = 1; else fi (x ￿ 1;y + 1) (22)
Such functions fi (8i(1 5 i 5 3)) are referred to as ￿xed-points of the re-
cursive program ￿ (recursive operator).
Note that these are ￿xed-points of functionals.
Remark 17 Note that f3, in contrast to f1 and f2, has the following special
property. 8hx;yi of pairs of integers such that f3 (x;y) is de￿ned, both f1 and
f2 are also de￿ned and have the same value as does f3.
￿ f3 is, then, said to be less de￿ned than or equal to f1 and f2 and this
property is denoted by f3 v f1 and f3 v f2:
￿ In fact, in this particular example, it so happens that f3 is less de￿ned
than or equal to all ￿xed points of ￿.
35If f (x) and g (x) are expressions involving the variables x = (x1;x2;:::::;xk), then:
f (x)’ g (x)
means: for any x, f (x) and g (x) are either both de￿ned or unde￿ned, and if de￿ned, they
are equal.
24￿ In addition, f3 is the only partial function with this property for ￿ and
is, therefore called the least ￿xed point of ￿.
We now have the minimal formal machinery needed to state one of the classic
theorems of recursive function theory, known variously as the ￿rst recursion
theorem, Kleene￿ s theorem or, sometimes, as the ￿xed point theorem for complete
partial orders.
Theorem 18 Suppose that ￿ : Fm ￿! Fm is a recursive operator (or a recur-
sive program ￿). Then there is a partial function f￿ that is the least ￿xed point
of ￿ :
￿(f￿) = f￿;
If ￿(g) = g, then f￿ v g:
Remark 19 If, in addition to being partial, f￿ is also total, then it is the
unique least ￿xed point. Note also that a recursive operator is characterized
by being continuous and monotone. There would have been some advantages in
stating this famous theorem highlighting the domain of de￿nition, i.e., complete
partial orders, but the formal machinery becomes slightly unwieldy.
Remark 20 Although this way of stating the (￿rst) recursion theorem almost
highlights its non-constructive aspect ￿ i.e., the theorem guarantees the exis-
tence of a ￿x-point without indicating a way of ￿nding it ￿it is possible to use
a slightly stronger form of the theorem to amend this ￿ defect￿ .
Before stating formally, as a summarizing theorem, the result, it is necessary
to formalize the rational agent and the setting in which rationality is exercised in
the expectational domain in recursion theoretic formalisms, too. This means, at
a minimum, the rational agent as a recursion theoretic agent36. The topological
￿x-point theorems harnessed by a rational agent are, as mentioned previously,
easily done in standard economic theory where the agents themselves are set-
theoretically formalized. There is no dissonance between the formalism in which
the rational agent is de￿ned and the economic setting in which such an agent
operates. The latter setting is also set theoretically de￿ned.
The recursion theoretic formalism introduced above presupposes that the
rational agent is now recursion theoretically de￿ned and so too the setting - i.e.,
the economy. De￿ning the rational agent recursion theoretically means de￿ning
the preferences characterizing the agent and the choice theoretic actions recur-
sion theoretically. This means, ￿rstly, de￿ning the domain of choice for the agent
number theoretically and, secondly, the choice of maximal (sub)sets over such
a domain in a computably viable way. Such a rede￿nition and reformalization
should mean equivalences between the rational choice of an agent over well de-
￿ned preferences and the computing activities of an ideal computer, i.e., Turing
36This should not cause any disquiet in expectational economics, at least not to those of
us who have accepted the Lucasian case for viewing agents as ￿ signal processors￿ who use
optimal ￿lters in their rational decision processing activities (cf. [33], p.9). Agents as ￿ signal
processors￿is only a special variant of being ￿ optimal computing units￿ .
25Machine (or any of its own formal equivalences, by the Church-Turing Thesis).
Since a complete formalism and the relevant equivalences are described, de￿ned
and, where necessary, rigorously proved in [66], chapter 3, I shall simply assume
the interested reader can be trusted to refer to it for any detailed clari￿cation
and substantiation.
It is now easy to verify that the domain over which the recursive operator and
the partial functions are de￿ned are weaker37 than the conventional domains
over which the economist works. Similarly, the continuity and monotonicity
of the recursive operator is naturally satis￿ed by the standard assumptions
in economic theory for the reaction or response function, T. Hence, we can
apply the ￿rst recursion theorem to equation (15), interpreting T as a recursive
operator and not as a topological mapping. Then we know that there is a partial
function - i.e., a computable function - ft that is the least ￿xed point of T. Thus,
we can summarize the desired result in the form of the following theorem:
Theorem 21 Suppose that the reaction or response function, T : Hm ￿! Hm
is a recursive operator (or a recursive program ￿). Then there is a computable
function ft that is a least ￿xed point of T :
T (ft) = ft;
If T (g) = g, then ft v g
Remark 22 Theorem 21 can be used directly to show that 9 a (recursive) pro-
gram that, under any input, outputs exactly itself. It is this program that acts
as the relevant reaction or response function for an economy in REE. The
existence of such a recursive program justi￿es the Newclassical methodological
stand on the ubiquity of rational expectations equilibria. However, since the
theorem is stated above in its non-constructive version, ￿nding this particular
recursive program requires a little e⁄ort. Hence, the need for learning processes
to ￿nd this program, unless the theorem is utilized in its constructive version.
Even with these caveats, the immediate advantage is that there is no need to
deal with non-recursive reals or non-computable functions in the recursion the-
oretic formalism. In the traditional formalism the ￿x-point that is the REE is,
except for ￿ukes, a non-recursive real; constructing learning processes to de-
termine non-recursive reals is either provably impossible or formally intractable
(computationally complex).
What are the further advantages of recasting the problem of solving for the
REE recursion theoretically rather than retaining the traditional topological
formalizations?
An advantage at the super￿cial level but nevertheless not unimportant in
policy oriented economic theoretic contexts is the simple fact that, as even
the name indicates, recursion encapsulates, explicitly, the idea of self-reference
because functions are de￿ned, naturally, in terms of themselves. Secondly the
37They are ￿ weaker￿in a very special sense. A domain of de￿nition that is number theo-
retically de￿ned ￿i.e., over only the rational or the natural numbers ￿rather than over the
whole of the real number system pose natural diophantine and combinatorial conundrums
that cannot easily be resolved by the standard operators of optimization.
26existence of a least ￿x point is a solution to the in￿nite-regress problem. Thus
the two conceptual di¢ culties that bedevil the theory of rational expectations
are formally encapsulated in one fell swoop, within one analytical framework -
and, that too, with a computable function.
Think of the formal discourse of economic analysis as being conducted in
a programming language; call it =. We know that we choose the underlying
terminology for economic formalisms with particular meanings in mind for the
elemental units: preferences, endowments, technology, information, expectation
and so on; call the generic element of the set &. When we form a compound eco-
nomic proposition out of the & units, the meaning is natural and clear. We can,
therefore, suppose that evaluating a compound expression in = is immediate:
given an expression in =, say ￿(&), the variables in ￿, when given speci￿c values
￿, are to be evaluated according to the semantics of =. To actually evaluate
a compound expression, ￿(&); we write a recursive program in the language =,
the language of economic theory.
But that leaves a key question unanswered: what is the computable function
that is implicitly de￿ned by the recursive program? The ￿rst recursion theorem
answers this question with the answer: the least ￿xed-point. In this case, there-
fore, there is a direct application of the ￿rst recursion theorem to the semantics
of the language =. The arti￿cial separation between the syntax of economic
analysis, when formalized, and its natural semantics can, therefore, be bridged
e⁄ectively.
If the language of economic theory is best regarded as a very high level
programming language, =, to understand a theorem in economics, in recursion
theoretic terms, represent the assumptions - i.e., axioms and the variables -
as input data and the conclusions as output data. State the theorem as an
expression in the language =:Then try to convert the proof into a program in
the language =, which will take in the inputs and produce the desired output.
If one is unable to do this, it is probably because the proof relies essentially
on some infusion of non-constructive or uncomputable elements. This step will
identify any inadvertent infusion of non-algorithmic reasoning, which will have
to be resolved - sooner or later, if computations are to be performed on the
variables as input data. The computations are not necessarily numerical; they
can also be symbolic.
In other words, if we take algorithms and data structures to be funda-
mental,then it is natural to de￿ne and understand functions in these terms. If a
function does not correspond to an algorithm, what can it be? The topological
de￿nition of a function is not naturally algorithmic. Therefore, the expressions
formed from the language of economic theory, in a topological formalization, are
not necessarily implementable by a program, except by ￿ ukes, appeal to magic
or by illegitimate, intractable and vague approximations. Hence the need to
dichotomize every topological existence proof. In the case of REE, this is the
root cause of the arti￿cial importance granted to a separate problem of learning
REEs.
275 Re￿ ections and Retrospectives
"... I want to emphasize that the methodology that transformed
macroeconomics is applicable to the study of virtually all ￿elds of
economics. In fact, the meaning of the word macroeconomics has
changed to refer to the tools being used38 rather than just to the
study of business cycle ￿ uctuations39."
Edward Prescott: ￿ The Transformation of Macroeconomic Policy and Research￿ ,
Nobel Prize Lecture ([48]; second set of italics, added)
The recursivization of macroeconomics has implied its mathematization in
a particular way. There is clear evidence that the frontiers of macroeconomics
is recursive macroeconomics. Paradoxically, however, the main aims of the
recursivization cannot be achieved by means of the particular mathematization
of macroeconomics that has come to be realized. I have discussed the reasons
above, in the previous sections.
Moreover, the microeconomics on which recursive macroeconomics is founded
￿orthodox general equilibrium theory ￿is intrinsically non-algorithmic and, in-
deed, cannot be algorithmized without drastic re-mathematization of its foun-
dations.
Why have mathematically minded macroeconomists, committed to a for-
mally quanti￿ed theory of aggregates, placing at the core of the subject com-
putational, numerical, approximation and experimental issues, failed to realize
the intrinsic non-numerical nature of the formal mathematics they use? Espe-
cially since there are at least two formal, alternative, mathematical formalisms,
far superior in numerical and algorithmic content, easily available for harness-
ing in their noble and laudable formalization enterprise: computability theory
and constructive mathematics (free of philosophical baggage of the Brouwerian
stringent variety). Moreover, both of these deep and well founded and highly
developed areas of mathematics have their formal metamathematical founda-
tions as well as their analytic handmaidens: recursion theory and proof theory
in the one case; computable analysis and constructive analysis in the other. In
fact, there are even many varieties of each of the latter, from which a mathe-
matically minded macroeconomist can choose, to suit his or her own purpose
in any particular application. For example, there are at least three di⁄erent
ways to appeal to a constructive version of the Hahn-Banach theorem so as to
substantiate the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics; there are at
least two di⁄erent ways to prove the validity of the ￿rst fundamental theorem
38Prescott is, of course, referring to mathematical and computational tools.
39I cannot resist the temptation to add, as a counter-weight to this sanguine view a trenchant
observation made by a previous Nobel Laureate, who may not have been unsympathetic to
the new classicals, when he reviewed the classic of an earlier generation, Paul Samuelson￿ s
Foundations of Economic Analysis ([62], p. 605):
"... [W]ho can know what tools we need unless he knows the material on which
they will be used."
28of welfare economics using computable analysis. Such proofs of existence come,
pari passu, with algorithmic possibilities. One illustration, for the case of REE,
was given in section 4, where embedding the problem, ab initio, in a recursion
theoretic setting obviated the need for the traditional two stage di¢ culty of ￿rst
proving existence and then devising mechanisms to locate the REE.
I must confess I have no reasonable answer to these questions ￿not even
conjectures.
A recent Nobel Laureate in economics, Finn Kydland, in his own ￿ Nobel
Lecture￿claims ([28], p. 341; italics added):
"The key tool macroeconomists use is the computational experi-
ment"
But he fails to have ever investigated whether any of the models he uses for
computational experiments is algorithmically ￿ i.e., computably or construc-
tively ￿founded or not. How can a computational experiment be conducted,
utilizing discrete data and using a non-computable, non-constructive model, for
quantitative policy experiments with a digital computer?
These are the paradoxes of Recursive Macroeconomics that will have to be
resolved as the mathematization of macroeconomics gathers pace and the digital
revolution is approached by the recursive revolution in macroeconomics itself.
There was a time, not too long ago, when the mathematical underpinnings
of macroeconomics was adequately learnable by a complete mastery of that
mid-20th century classic by Paul Samuelson: Foundations of Economic Analy-
sis, FOA ([46]). Any mathematically minded macroeconomist, having to read
Patinkin￿ s classic ([47], right up to its second edition, was adequately prepared
with the mathematics in FOA. A little later, with the dominance of von Neu-
mann growth models, turnpike theory and optimal growth theory, there were
Nikaido￿ s two admirable books ([43], [44]) that summarised the necessary math-
ematics for the mathematically minded macroeconomist40. Those who were
interested in exotic macrodynamics ￿nonlinear trade cycle theory, for example
- also had their textbooks, for example, [18], [19].
It is, however, only now that we have a sustained development of particular
kind of macroeconomics, entirely driven by a commitment to a particular math-
ematical framework: recursive dynamics. Thus it is that the Lucas-Stokey text,
[36], has replaced FOA, and even more comprehensively. There is one dominant
macroeconomic paradigm ￿the SDGE model ￿and there is one integrated set
of mathematical tools to be mastered to work within it, and to push its fron-
tiers, and that set is adequately covered in one comprehensive textbook. And
this story can be further substantiated by studying, carefully, as I have had to
do ￿both as a student and as a teacher of advanced macroeconomic theory ￿
40It is interesting to recall Solow￿ s closing lines in his enthusiastic Foreward to the book on
growth, in 1970, by two of his own pupils ([59], p. ix, italics in original):
"The mind boggles at the thought of the sort of books that their students may
write."
29the evolution of the economic contents and the mathematical sophistication of
the series of textbooks on Macroeconomics written by a leading exponent of
recursive macroeconomics: Tom Sargent ([53], [54] and [37]). In particular, the
emergence of the RCE concept and the necessary mathematics for it.
So, it appears as if Macroeconomics, in its mathematical mode, as Recursive
Macroeconomics, has achieved what was achieved by Debreu￿ s classic codi￿ca-
tion of Walrasian economics, in 1959 ([9]), built on the shoulders of his pioneer-
ing work with Arrow, and that, in turn, on the mighty foundations laid by von
Neumann-Morgenstern and Nash. A half century later, Macroeconomics seems
to have achieved a similar codi￿cation.
Yet, there is disquiet, at least in the fringes of the frontiers, if not at the
core. Noble attempts are continuing in trying to develop a macrodynamics that
is consistently nonlinear in its dynamic underpinnings and evolutionary and dis-
equilibrium in its conceptual outlook. Richard Day, Sidney Winter and Richard
Nelson come to mind as the ￿ patrons￿of such an alternative ￿and their fol-
lowers (I have in mind the series of outstanding books in this genre merging
from a group of researchers working with and around Peter Flaschel ￿cf. for
example, [15], [4], [5], and the constant stream of high quality texts coming
out of this ￿ stable￿ , with a uni￿ed theme, both from an economic and a math-
ematical point of view). In contrast to the relentlessly equilibrium-dominated,
stochastic dynamic, recursive mathematical macroeconomics, this alternative is
disequilibrium-dominated, nonlinear dynamic endogenous macroeconomics.
The kind of mathematical macroeconomics that I myself see as emerging
in the years to come is Recursion Theoretic Macroeconomics or Computable
Macroeconomics41. The kind of mathematics that will underpin such a macro-
economics will be determined by the need to conduct the computational ex-
periments on digital computers, using digitally available economic data. The
dissonance between an economic theory developed with the mathematics of real
analysis and an applied economics having to indulge in inexplicable contortions
to make theory and data mesh seamlessly with the experimental tool, will have
to come to an end. When it does, I hope there will be a reasonably complete
Computable Macroeconomics, building on recursion theory and constructive
mathematics, readily available for students to turn to, rely on and work with.
When that happens, we will not have to be too seriously concerned with Maury
Osborne￿ s perceptive perplexity:
"There are numerous other paradoxical beliefs of this society [of econo-
mists], consequent to the di⁄erence between discrete numbers .. in which data
is recorded, whereas the theoreticians of this society tend to think in terms of
real numbers. ...No matter how hard I looked, I never could see any actual
real [economic] data that showed that [these solid, smooth, lines of economic
theory] ... actually could be observed in nature. ...... At this point a beady
eyed Chicken Little might ... say, ￿ Look here, you can￿ t have solid lines on that
41I coined the phrase Computable Macroeconomics, in the sense discussed above, when I
was working with my friend Jean-Paul Fitoussi on our piece for the Patinkin Festschrift,
in summer, 1990 (cf. [14]).
30picture because there is always a smallest unit of money ... and in addition there
is always a unit of something that you buy. ..[I]n any event we should have just
whole numbers of some sort on [the supply-demand] diagram on both axes. The
lines should be dotted. ... Then our mathematician Zero will have an objection
on the grounds that if we are going to have dotted lines instead of solid lines on
the curve then there does not exist any such thing as a slope, or a derivative, or
a logarithmic derivative either. .... .
If you think in terms of solid lines while the practice is in terms of dots
and little steps up and down, this misbelief on your part is worth, I would say
conservatively, to the governors of the exchange, at least eighty million dollars
per year.
[45], pp.16-34
The mind boggles at the thought of the current pro￿ts being made by the
governers of the exchange, simply in view of ￿ our misbeliefs￿about ￿ dots and
little steps￿vs.￿ solid lines.
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